

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 223272

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OREP, CODEL, IPU

SUBJECT: IPU: MEXICAN ITEM ON NON-INTERFERENCE IN
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES

REF: TOKYO 13080

1. USDEL MAY FIND FOLLOWING MATERIAL FROM VARIED SOURCES
USEFUL FOR POINTS PARA 2 REFTEL:

A. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY TO THE SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SEPT 19, REFERRING TO ALLENDE:

"AS THE PRESIDENT POINTED OUT, THE INTENT OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAS NOT TO DESTABILIZE OR TO
SUBVERT HIM BUT TO KEEP HIM, BUT TO KEEP IN BEING THOSE
POLITICAL PARTIES THAT HAD TRADITIONALLY CONTESTED THE
ELECTIONS, AND OUR CONCERN WAS WITH THE ELECTION IN
1976 AND NOT AT ALL WITH A COUP IN 1973 ABOUT WHICH WE
KNEW NOTHING AND WHICH WE HAD NOTHING-TO DO AS I TESTIFIED
TO IN 1973, AND AS THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED."

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B. IN HIS BOOK "CONVERSATIONS WITH ALLENDE", FRENCH MARXIST REGIS DEBRAY QUOTES PRESIDENT ALLENDE IN JANUARY 1971 ON THE SUBJECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO ACHIEVING A SOCIALIST STATE IN CHILE, AS FOLLOWS: "AS FOR THE BOURGEOIS STATE AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, WE ARE

SEEKING TO OVERCOME IT. TO OVERTHROW IT."

C. EXCERPT FROM "ALLENDE AND THE MYTH MAKERS" BY DAVID HOLDEN, WHICH APPEARED IN THE BRITISH JOURNAL "ENCOUNTER" OF JANUARY 1974:

"... REVOLUTIONS ARE BORN OF, OR GENERATE, SECTIONAL CONFLICT--A FACT OF POLITICAL LIFE THAT ALLENDE ACKNOWLEDGED EVERY TIME HE SPOKE OF 'OVERTHROWING' WHAT HE CALLED THE 'BOURGEOIS' STATE. BUT A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION RESTS UPON CONSENSUS--A BASIC ACCEPTANCE OF THE FACT THAT THE STATE REPRESENTS MORE THAN A MERELY SECTIONAL INTEREST. THE SECOND PERMITS REFORM, BUT THE FIRST DENIES IT; AND THERE IS NO WAY OF RECONCILING THE TWO.

"ALL ALLENDE'S PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES FOLLOWED FROM THIS SIMPLE DISTINCTION. TAKEN SERIOUSLY, HIS CONSTITUTIONALISM MEANT THAT HIS PROGRAMME COULD ONLY SUCCEED IF A MAJORITY WOULD ACTUALLY VOTE FOR IT. BUT, ELECTED AS HE WAS WITH ONLY JUST OVER A THIRD OF THE POPULAR VOTE AND WITH A LARGE MAJORITY OF CONGRESS AGAINST HIM, ALLENDE HAD NEITHER A DEMOCRATIC NOR AN ADMINISTRATIVELY EFFECTIVE MANDATE FOR HIS REVOLUTION. INDEED, IN A PARLIAMENTARY RATHER THAN A PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY, HE WOULD PROBABLY NEVER HAVE BEEN ABLE TO BEGIN.

"IF HE WAS TO SUCCEED WITHIN HIS SIX-YEAR TERM OF OFFICE EVEN IN OPENING THE DOOR TO REVOLUTION, LET ALONE ESTABLISHING IT AS ACCOMPLISHED FACT, HE HAD TO TRANSFORM HIS MINORITY INTO A MAJORITY. BUT HOW TO DO IT? FOR, IF WORDS MEANT ANYTHING, ALLENDE'S HAD TO MEAN THAT HE INTENDED TO REPLACE THE EXISTING, REFORMABLE CONSTITUTION OF CHILE WITH ANOTHER THAT WOULD BE, OF ITS MARXIST NATURE, IRREVERSIBLE. IN OTHER WORDS, A SYSTEM

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THAT WAS ADMITTEDLY DEMOCRATIC WAS TO BE USED TO BUILD ANOTHER THAT WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY DICTATORIAL. THIS WAS ASKING THE MAJORITY TO HANG ITSELF FROM ITS OWN GALLOWS; AND, NOT SURPRISINGLY, IT DECLINED.

"ALLENDE'S ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME THIS BASIC ILLOGICALITY IN HIS POSITION WERE PRECISELY WHAT ENSURED HIS ULTIMATE

DOWNFALL. REFUSING TO ABANDON EITHER HIS REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC OR HIS PROFESSED CONSTITUTIONALISM HE WAS FORCED TO RELY MORE AND MORE UPON POLITICAL ILLUSIONISM. HIS SLEIGHT-OF-HAND WAS OFTEN REMARKABLE, AS HE SOUGHT TO OUTWIT THE OPPOSITION MAJORITY IN CONGRESS BY EXPLOITING

THE LETTER OF THE CONSTITUTION, USING EVERY LEGAL LOOP-HOLE TO FORCE UPON THEM MEASURES THEY DID NOT WANT. BUT IN THE PROCESS, INEVITABLY, HE DESTROYED THE CONSTITUTION'S SPIRIT, SO THAT HIS OPPONENTS BECAME AS RUTHLESS AS HE WAS. AT THE START HE WON CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR NEEDED CHANGES LIKE THE NATIONALISATION OF THE COPPER MINES, LAND REFORM, AND THE STATE'S TAKEOVER OF BANKS AND MAJOR INDUSTRIES-- EVIDENCE THAT THE DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS COULD AND WOULD WORK WITHIN THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION. BUT, AT THE END, NOT A SINGLE MEMBER OF THE OPPOSITION MAJORITY WOULD CAST A VOTE IN HIS SUPPORT. THEY VOTED UNANIMOUSLY TO CONDEMN HIS "HABITUAL ILLEGALITIES" AND WERE EVEN JOINED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN ACCUSING HIM OF DISREGARDING THE RULE OF LAW. HE HAD CUT AWAY THE MIDDLE GROUND OF CHILEAN POLITICS, WRECKED THE DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS, AND BEGOTTEN THE REALITY OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION THROUGH HIS OWN ADDICTION TO REVOLUTIONARY SLOGANS."

D. EXCERPTS FROM ARTICLE BY EVERETT G. MARTIN IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, SEPT 18, 1974, TITLED "DID THE CHILEAN PRESS NEED CIA HELP?":

"WHERE OPPOSITION NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES WERE CONCERNED, THE ALLENDE FORCES DID VERY LITTLE OVERTLY TO CURTAIL THEIR RIGHT TO PRINT WHAT THEY WANTED. BUT
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THE EVIDENCE INDICATES A CLEAR ATTEMPT TO STRANGLE THEM ECONOMICALLY BY CUTTING OFF THEIR REVENUE.

"THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT AND STATE-OWNED INDUSTRIES WERE THE LARGEST SINGLE GROUP OF ADVERTISERS. IT WASN'T SURPRISING IN SUCH A POLARIZED SITUATION THAT THEY STOPPED ADVERTISING IN OPPOSITION MEDIA. AS THE MARXISTS THROUGH ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER TOOK CONTROL OF THE BANKS AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT HOLD OVER ADVERTISING BECAME OVERWHELMING. THE WORSENING ECONOMIC SITUATION AND SCARCITIES EXACERBATED THE SITUATION UNTIL PUBLICATIONS APPEARED WITH VIRTUALLY NO VISIBLE MEANS OF SUPPORT.

"THEN THERE WAS THE MARXIST ATTEMPT TO TAKE OVER THE PAPER COMPANY, KNOWN FAMILIARLY AS THE PAPELERA, THAT SUPPLIED 65 PERCENT OF THE NEWSPRINT. FAILING IN AN EFFORT TO BUY THE FIRM'S SHARES AND TO AGITATE THE 51,000 WORKERS TO SEIZE THE PLANTS, THE GOVERNMENT TRIED TO FORCE IT INTO BANKRUPTCY, WHICH MEANS AUTOMATIC

GOVERNMENT CONTROL. DENIED ANYTHING BUT INSIGNIFICANT PRICE INCREASES AT A TIME WHEN COSTS WERE TRIPLING, PAPELERA WAS SOON LOSING THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS A DAY. ..."

"NEWSPAPERS IN SMALLER TOWNS CAME UNDER MORE DIRECT ATTACK THAN THE BIG DAILIES OF SANTIAGO. AN EDITOR'S LIFE WAS THREATENED IN RANCAGUA BY MOBS OF LEFTISTS, AND WORKERS SEIZED CONTROL OF PAPERS IN OTHER CITIES. IN TALCA AFTER WORKERS SEIZED THE PAPER, THE SUPREME COURT RULED IT WAS ILLEGAL; BUT THE GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO OBEY THE COURT ORDER TO END THE OCCUPATION. ... "

"ONCE A SANTIAGO (RADIO) STATION WAS CLOSED BECAUSE IT REPORTED THAT TWO MINERS WERE SHOT TO DEATH DURING A COPPER STRIKE. ... FOR THIS, THE GOVERNMENT DECLARED THE STATION HAD ENDANGERED NATIONAL SECURITY. THE SUPREME COURT AGAIN ORDERED THE STATION REOPENED, BUT THE GOVERNMENT MINISTER INVOLVED REFUSED. ..."

"THE UNIVERSITY OF CHILE HAD A (TV) STATION IN
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SANTIAGO THAT WAS STAFFED ENTIRELY WITH EXTREME LEFTISTS BROADCASTING PURE MARXIST PROPAGANDA. THE STUDENT BODY VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY IN A REFERENDUM TO EXPELL THE LEFTISTS AND CHANGE TO A NEUTRAL FORMAT; BUT WHEN THE SCHOOL'S ADMINISTRATION, WHICH WAS BOUND BY LAW TO OBEY THE REFERENDUM, TRIED TO TAKE CONTROL, THE LEFTISTS REJECTED THEM BY FORCE.

"THE POLICE WOULDN'T ACT, AND PRESIDENT ALLENDE ORDERED UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS TO CONTINUE THE MARXISTS ON THE PAYROLL. THEN THE SCHOOL TRIED TO SET UP A SECOND STATION, BUT THE POLICE RAIDED IT AND SMASHED THE EQUIPMENT.

"THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY RAN INTO SIMILAR REPRESSION WHEN IT TRIED TO SET UP A SECOND CHANNEL TO SERVE THE SOUTHERN CITY OF CONCEPCION WITH A FORMAT THAT ATTEMPTED TO BE NON-PARTISAN."

"IT WAS GENUINELY A QUESTION HOW LONG SOME ELEMENTS OF CHILE'S OPPOSITION MEDIA COULD HOLD OUT AS THE

PRESSURE AGAINST IT MOUNTED NEAR THE END OF THE ALLENDE
ADMINISTRATION. ..."

2. DEPT SUGGESTS THAT SINCE ITEM INITIATED BY MEXICANS,
NOT SOVIETS OR OTHER COMMUNIST REPRESENTATIVES, NO USEFUL
PURPOSE IS SERVED BY GRATUITOUSLY RAISING QUESTION OF
SOVIET ACTIVITIES AND FORCING COMMUNIST BLOC INTO THE
DEBATE. INGERSOLL

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